The End of the Military-Industrial Complex

William J. Lynn III
Foreign Affairs
Nov-Dec 2014

In late 2013, Google announced that it had acquired Boston Dynamics, an engineering and robotics company best known for creating BigDog, a four-legged robot that can accompany soldiers into rough terrain. Much of the resulting hype focused on the Internet giant and when it might start making various types of robots. What was good news for Google, however, represented a major loss for the U.S. Department of Defense. Although Google agreed to honor Boston Dynamics’ existing defense commitments, including its contracts with the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Marine Corps, the company indicated that it might not pursue any additional work for the military. In practice, this means that the Department of Defense could lose its edge in the emerging field of autonomous robotics, which once fell almost exclusively under its domain.

It came as no surprise that Google had the money to buy Boston Dynamics; the technology star’s growth potential and investments in research and development (R & D) far exceed those of any defense enterprise. Its market value, nearly $400 billion, is more than double that of General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon put together. And with the $60 billion it has on hand, Google could buy all the outstanding shares of any one of them.

Google may not need defense contracts, but the Pentagon needs more and better relationships with companies like Google. Only the private sector can provide the kind of cutting-edge technology that has given U.S. troops a distinct advantage for the past 70 years. And beyond courting commercial companies, the Pentagon must also adapt to an increasingly global defense industry, since critical defense technologies are no longer the sole province of U.S.-based companies.

Consider, for example, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, an aircraft developed, financed, and tested by nine countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Like Google’s acquisition of Boston Dynamics, the development of the F-35 poses both an opportunity and a challenge. On the one hand, Washington needs international and commercial partnerships to sustain its weapons development program, the largest in history.

The Pentagon needs more and better relationships with companies like Google.

According to a 2012 study by the consulting firm Booz & Company (now Strategy&), more than one-third of what the Pentagon spends on procurement and services goes to nontraditional companies such as Apple and Dell. On the other hand, the Defense Department’s outdated procurement process makes it difficult for new companies to enter the U.S. market. The Pentagon cannot afford to keep in place such barriers to entry, especially when the U.S. military relies so heavily on nontraditional suppliers to gain an edge over its potential adversaries.

Taken together, commercialization and globalization -- coupled with a decline in U.S. defense spending -- have ushered in a new era for the U.S. defense industry. In the past, the industry has adapted well to change, allowing the United States to maintain its military dominance. In weathering the current transition, however, the Pentagon is off to a slow start.

IN THE BEGINNING

Over the past two centuries, the U.S. defense industry experienced three distinct eras. In the first, which lasted from 1787 to 1941, the sector consisted largely of government-owned arsenals and shipyards, supplemented by commercial industry only in times of actual conflict (during World War I, for example).

The sheer scale of World War II and its abundance of new wartime technologies, however, required a dramatic change. In 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt established the War Production Board, a federal agency tasked with conscripting the largest U.S. industrial enterprises, most notably those in the automobile industry, into wartime service. At the start of the twentieth century, defense spending had averaged roughly one percent of GDP, growing to just three percent in the 1930s. During World War II, however, defense spending skyrocketed, to roughly 40 percent of GDP, and defense became the country’s largest industry. As a result, the United States overwhelmed its adversaries with its industrial capacity and power.

After the war ended, Washington did not dismantle the defense industry it had developed. Instead, the large, diversified industrial conglomerates that had produced defense equipment during the war, including Boeing and General Motors, maintained their defense divisions. These companies, joined in later years by AT&T, General Electric, and IBM, passed technology fluidly between markets. Backed financially by the Pentagon and benefiting from long production runs, they created technologies ranging from drones to night-vision goggles, some of which eventually trickled down into citizens’ daily lives. Today, for example, most cars come with GPS, and few Americans could live without the Internet -- innovations both initially funded by the Pentagon.

This second era -- the one marked by the emergence of what President Dwight Eisenhower famously called “the military-industrial complex” -- ended with the Cold War, when the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union contributed to a rapid decline in U.S. military spending. In 1993, the Department of Defense invited industry leaders to the Pentagon for a “last supper,” at which then Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry urged them to consolidate in light of the shrinking budget. So began the third era, in which the industry shifted from diversified conglomerates, which could tap into their large reservoirs of commercial technology, to the handful of companies that focus exclusively on defense and still dominate the industry today. From 1992 to 1997, a total of $55 billion in industry mergers took place. With few exceptions, the large conglomerates moved out of the industry, selling off their defense operations. At the same time, the new cadre of defense-only firms began selling off their commercial operations and acquiring smaller defense companies, thinning the ranks of midtier defense suppliers.

Despite changing norms and shrinking budgets, the Defense Department has moved from era to era without incident. Through each transformation, the Pentagon protected key technologies and continued to support the U.S. military. Today, however, pressures from commercialization and globalization have exposed serious fault lines in the industry’s structure. If the United States does not adapt now to the fourth era, its defense industry will soon see its strength wither away.

PLAYING CATCH-UP

For more than a decade, U.S. defense companies have been lagging further and further behind large commercial companies in technology investment. Although the Pentagon historically exported many technologies to the commercial sector, it is now a net importer. Indeed, next-generation commercial technology has leapt far ahead of what the defense industry can produce in areas spanning 3-D printing, cloud computing, cybersecurity, nanotechnology, robotics, and more. In addition, commercial information technology dominates national security today as much as it does the private sector. Soldiers now use smartphones to gather real-time surveillance from drones and send messages to fellow soldiers.

Keeping up with commercial innovations will be difficult, if not impossible. The combined R & D budgets of five of the largest U.S. defense contractors (about $4 billion, according to the research firm Capital Alpha Partners) amount to less than half of what companies such as Microsoft or Toyota spend on R & D in a single year. Taken together, these five U.S. defense titans do not even rank among the top 20 individual industrial investors worldwide. Instead of funding R & D, defense companies have been returning the overwhelming majority of their available cash to shareholders in the form of dividends and stock buybacks. As a result, from 2000 to 2012, company-funded R & D spending at the top U.S. defense firms dropped from 3.5 percent to roughly two percent of sales, according to Capital Alpha Partners. The leading commercial companies, by contrast, invest an average of eight percent of their revenue in R & D.

Of course, the defense market is different from commercial markets in that the customer -- the Pentagon -- funds much of the R & D. But this budget has fallen as well. Defense companies are therefore reluctant to invest their own cash in research that, because of uncertainty in the Pentagon’s budget, may never yield viable products.

The Defense Department should be courting commercial companies, many of which will not seek out defense contracts themselves. Instead, the Pentagon has made it so difficult to bid on defense contracts that many companies shy away, finding the process unfamiliar and daunting. Some also avoid bidding because they have little interest in complying with what they see as unnecessary Pentagon requirements. For example, a number of software developers have refused defense work because they fear they would have to relinquish the intellectual property rights to whatever they produce. Others are driven away by the U.S. government’s elaborate regulations for the acquisition of weapons. Audit and oversight regulations, for example, require companies to establish new and costly accounting systems, beyond what they need for their commercial business. This added expense is hard to justify for programs that often take a decade or longer to transition from development to production.

Officials have discussed overhauling the Pentagon’s Byzantine procurement system for decades and have instituted modest reforms, including relying more on independent cost estimates and weapons testing. But the gains have not kept pace with the rapid technological and industrial change in the commercial sector. Future reforms should move beyond improving costs and timeliness to lowering barriers to entry for commercial companies. The Pentagon can attract companies such as Google by loosening its stringent intellectual property rules, streamlining its audit and accounting requirements, and shortening development cycles. Sticking to the status quo will only put further distance between Washington and Silicon Valley.

MOVING BEYOND BORDERS

As technological innovations have grown more commercial, they have also become more global. In the private sector, a single product -- the iPhone, for example -- often contains technology from a worldwide network of suppliers. Similarly, some weapons systems, such as the F-35, now owe their existence to international collaboration. But the U.S. defense industry has not taken advantage of this shift, in part because some government officials fear that globalization will take jobs away from U.S. citizens and compromise critical defense technologies. These fears are shortsighted. A more global U.S. defense industry will be larger and stronger, and it will give the United States more, not less, access to leading technologies.

For comparison, consider the trajectory of the U.S. automobile industry. Japanese car companies began opening manufacturing plants in the United States in the 1980s; today, the number of auto plants operated by foreign companies on U.S. soil almost equals the number run by American automakers. Honda now exports more cars from the United States than it imports from Japan. And the definition of what constitutes an American or a foreign car has become blurred, creating an industry in which foreign manufacturers employ thousands of Americans and U.S. companies see robust sales overseas. Honda and Toyota, for example, now produce seven of the ten models with the highest percentage of U.S.-made parts, and the South Carolina BMW factory has become the largest exporter of American-made cars.

The U.S. defense industry has not opened itself up to globalization in quite the same way. On the battlefield, the U.S. military fights alongside its allies, with troops training together and sharing intelligence. But the Defense Department still often ignores technologies and products made overseas -- sometimes at significant cost to the American taxpayer. In the early years of this century, for example, the Pentagon sought to develop a new artillery system, called “the Crusader,” rather than adapt a robust German design that met most, if not all, U.S. requirements. The Defense Department ended up canceling the program in 2002 when the unit costs became unaffordable, wasting $2 billion and leaving the U.S. Army to rely on upgrades to a much older artillery model. To benefit from the investments and innovations of its allies, the Pentagon must be open to foreign sources for technology and design. The United States no longer has to be the source of all advances in military technology, and in fact, bringing foreign companies into the fold will help distribute the burden of development costs, as it did with the F-35.

ADAPT TO SURVIVE

For all the changes outside the U.S. defense industry, there remains a glaring one within it: the shrinking defense budget. The drawdowns in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the global economic crisis, have contributed to a roughly 20 percent decline in U.S. defense spending over the past five years.

A spending decline alone would not drive a structural change in the industry; when combined with the commercialization and globalization of defense technology, however, change appears inescapable. That change will include a consolidation of the industry and a concurrent drop in competition among suppliers. Indeed, competition for defense contracts has reached a historic low, making it difficult for the Pentagon to get the best value for taxpayers’ money. Where the Pentagon once employed two or three competing companies for major weapons programs, it now often struggles to afford contracts with more than one supplier. As a result, in 2012, both the navy and the air force awarded more than half their contracts without any competition at all.

If the Pentagon makes it easier for commercial and foreign companies to enter the industry, it will go a long way toward increasing competition. For example, BAE Systems, a British defense company that has become one of the Pentagon’s largest suppliers, has already provided needed diversity in the field of combat vehicles. Similarly, in the search for a new airborne tanker, the European aircraft manufacturing company Airbus has offered a viable alternative to Boeing. Increased competition will ensure that the Pentagon receives the best technology at the lowest price and will allow the United States to demonstrate the openness of its market at a time when declining budgets have already sent U.S. defense companies seeking sales overseas.

As officials in Washington weigh reforms, there is little time to lose. In both the defense industry and the world at large, the pace of change has accelerated. The first era of the U.S. defense industry lasted more than 150 years, the second nearly 50, and the third just 20. The Pentagon must take a more active role in recruiting outside companies, keeping in mind that their futures are inextricably intertwined. The United States has the opportunity to look beyond its borders to turn this fourth era to its advantage. Since World War II, the country’s technological advantages have protected its national security. To maintain that advantage, the United States must adapt to -- and ultimately embrace -- the trends that will come to define its future.

ICC ON TRIAL

Kip Hale
Foreign Affairs
Dec 11 2014

In 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) came into being. At the time, observers were hopeful that rule of law could help constrain humanity’s worst impulses, a sentiment that, today, may seem foolhardy. Yet, where else would victims turn? Ruthless tyrants and their henchmen have killed, raped, and tortured innocents, and few, if any, international institutions have been able to stop them or provide justice after the fact.

The ICC has very real and sometimes infuriating limitations. Convictions are too few, cases are too long, and the backlog is too high; frustrations inside and outside the court grow. But so does the demand for the ICC’s help. Whether it be in Syria, Palestine, North Korea, Sri Lanka, or in reaction to U.S. and British activities abroad, the ICC’s problems have not kept governments and people from urging it to get involved in more and more places. Thus, the promise of the ICC remains intact, despite the challenges it faces.

However, now it is confronting one of its biggest tests. On December 3, 2014, ICC judges ordered that the case against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, who is accused of crimes against humanity for planning and funding violence in the wake of Kenya’s 2007 elections, should proceed within one week or be dismissed. Two days later, the prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, having already conceded that Kenya’s non-cooperation with her investigation left the case unready for trial, withdrew the charges. She reserved the right to file them again in the future.

Her decision was highly anticipated. Leading up to the withdrawal of the charges, the media-savvy Kenyan government and its interlocutors had painted the ICC as a neocolonial tool of the West used to target disfavored African leaders. As evidence, they pointed to the absence of any non-African cases on the court’s current docket. Further, they argued, criminal trials anywhere, whether in Kenya or The Hague, disrupt Kenya’s attempts to move on from its recent bloody past and build a stable, peaceful future.

Compelling as this narrative may seem to some, the truth is much simpler: With 122 members heavily concentrated in Latin America and Africa, and with Africans in many key leadership posts, the ICC reflects the world it represents. Kenyan officials’ condemnation of the ICC was a cynical way to maintain power. If the activities of senior Kenyan governmental officials who were private citizens during the 2007 post-election violence and are alleged to have been involved in mass atrocities were never aired in a courtroom, those officials would avoid not only conviction but also reputational damage. Their grip on power in Kenya, as a result, would remain secure.

In years past, they would not have needed to worry. Traditionally, government leaders who organized mass atrocities either lived out their days in power or were comfortably exiled when not in power. The prospect of prosecution was remote at best. The rules of this sordid game began to change, however, when the Nuremberg Trials held Nazi officials accountable for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Those trials set a standard for dealing with leaders such as Liberia’s Charles Taylor, former Yugoslavia’s Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic, and Cambodia’s Nuon Chea, who were all tried for their participation in atrocities. Demands for justice slowly became a regular part of diplomatic and popular discourse whenever atrocities occurred.

To keep their impunity, political figures had to get more sophisticated. With the help of London-based public relations firms, Kenya’s government crafted, as David Bosco, an assistant professor at American University, called it, “the how-to manual for frustrating” ICC cases. The new impunity playbook is as straightforward as it is nefarious. First, win public sympathy by distorting facts to make the judicial process look unfair and biased. At the same time, feign cooperation with the court to provide cover for step two, which is to quietly yet thoroughly undermine the criminal case through witness intimidation and evidence tampering. This second step is possible because the ICC (like all other international tribunals) relies on the states in which the crimes occurred to guarantee access and on other states to use political and diplomatic pressure to get the country in question to cooperate with the ICC.

To win in the court of public opinion, the Kenyan government and its allies called into question the ICC’s fairness and legitimacy by pointing out that all individuals under investigation or prosecution at the ICC are from Africa. It did not matter that the ICC was, in most cases, responding to requests by African countries to investigate atrocities committed in their country. (The U.N. Security Council referred two other African countries to the ICC without obstruction by China and Russia, themselves hardly enablers of Western imperialism.) The one outlier is Kenya, where, starting in 2009 the then-ICC prosecutor initiated formal investigations in the 2007 election violence consistent with Kenya’s status as an ICC State Party. However, he did so only after a Kenyan investigative commission recommended that the ICC step in if Kenya failed to create a domestic tribunal, which it did not.

The unfortunate reality is that the continent with the highest number of atrocity-ridden conflicts is Africa. Of greater relevance, within the ICC’s jurisdiction, is the fact that a higher percentage of African countries are party to the ICC than, say, Middle Eastern countries (27 percent versus two percent). In short, the ICC’s involvement in Africa is the logical fulfillment of its mandate. That is not to say that the perception of a Hague-based international court with live cases solely against Africans is not troubling. It is. Yet, to ignore millions of African victims for the sake of appearing “balanced” would truly compromise the ICC’s integrity.

Further, the premise put forth by Kenya’s government—that the ICC is a “tool” for the West push out disfavored regimes—is far-fetched. In fact, regime change may be the last thing Western powers would want in Kenya, given that the Kenyan government has been a reliable counter-terrorism ally.  

Even so, the Kenyan officials’ narrative about the ICC took hold. And then it was time for the second step in the new impunity handbook—undermining the case. With many states diplomatically and politically unwilling to support what they believed was a biased ICC, Kenya had cover to disrupt the ICC cases more dramatically. Of course, it was careful not to do so blatantly. Instead, Kenyan authorities issued a litany of public pronouncements vowing full cooperation. At the same time, key witnesses due to testify in the Kenyatta cases were bribed and intimidated, assets were not frozen in defiance of court orders, access to information was restricted, and meaningful cooperation was not forthcoming.

In the meantime, the new model of impunity has been catching on. For example, Laurent Gbagbo, the deposed president of Cote d’Ivoire who is sitting in an ICC jail awaiting trial, is running for reelection, a tactic Kenyatta used as a private citizen to gain “head of state” status, which he argued would shield him from prosecution—a legally dubious proposition, at best.

So, where does the international community go from here? For one, the ICC should recognize its own mistakes. It committed missteps on the diplomatic stage—failure to resort to the ICC Assembly of State Parties for Kenya’s non-cooperation far earlier—and should have followed a better investigation and prosecution strategy from the start, especially when the Kenyan suspects were private citizens. For instance, the ICC should have had a permanent investigative field office in Kenya collecting documentary and communications evidence from the start.

Yet, to focus on these missteps would be to deflect true blame. Unless countries that are party to the ICC are willing to accept an international tribunal with its own enforcement power (that is, an ICC police force), individual states will need to take their duty to cooperate with the ICC more seriously. To date, most of them have stood idly by while Kenya unleashed its political attacks on the ICC. The failure to counter this assault, for example, by making regional security assistance with Kenya conditional on cooperation with the ICC, calls into question why the international community formed the ICC in the first place: establish international peace and security through a just rule of law.  

The countries that are party to the ICC must begin to make tough decisions, starting this week as they, and influential observer nations such as the United States, gather in New York for the ICC Assembly of States. In many ways, this conference will forecast the future of the ICC. Vitally important subjects are on the agenda: the woeful underfunding of the Court and Kenyan proposals to amend the ICC’s governing treaty to codify statutory immunity for heads of state.

As the assembly begins, the question to be answered is, which countries, if any, will choose to be true leaders in international criminal justice. If no one takes up the call, victims of atrocities, both living and those not yet born, will bear the consequences.  

               10 AÑOS DE ALBA  O DE COMO CHULEAR A VENEZUELA 

                                   

La Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de nuestra América (ALBA) cumple 10 años el 14 de Diciembre próximo. Fue creada en La Habana por el tirano Fidel Castro y Chávez mediante convenio.

Todos sus miembros tienen suficientes razones para celebrar en esa fecha, excepto Venezuela.

La idea original fue del venezolano. Una “revelación” que tuvo en Margarita una madrugada, como él mismo lo confesó en una reunión que ese día tuvo con los países del Caribe.

La ALBA no es más que un tinglado clientelar cuyo propósito ha sido hacerse con un área de influencia geopolítica incorporando a gobiernos afines ideológicamente, pero echando mano de parte importante de fondos provenientes del petróleo venezolano para repartirlos entre aquellos, y así asegurar apoyos internacionales. Es parte de la llamada petrodiplomacia, una iniciativa que en definitiva ha contribuido a empobrecer a Venezuela, lo demás es retórica para público de galería. Nada aporta a los intereses de nuestro país. Es una sangría de recursos sin compensación alguna.

Desde un principio se pretendió presentar el proyecto como integracionista, de lo cual nada tiene, no crea mecanismos concretos para ello. Son meros acuerdos bilaterales de sus miembros con Venezuela. Más allá de crear un banco entelequia que aprovecharían algunos, menos los venezolanos, y empresas llamadas “grannacionales”, las cuales brillan por su ausencia, no hay nada sustantivo.

Basta revisar las cifras de intercambio comercial para medir sus efectos: gran  negocio para los beneficiarios e inexistente provecho para Venezuela.

Como se sabe, en materia petrolera, PetroCaribe se inscribe en la ALBA. Allí, Venezuela, país que paga el convite, entrega el crudo a todos los países que se apuntan al festín a precio de ganga y les financia el 50% de la factura a 25 años, un regalo. Por este concepto, y siendo muy conservadores, nos deben, según algunos, alrededor de 18.000 millones de dólares, cifra que hoy estamos necesitando desesperadamente; de allí que el gobierno esté rematando esas facturas en el mercado financiero al precio de gallina flaca.

Si nos vamos al sector no petrolero del comercio, el panorama no es menos desfavorable para Venezuela.

Tomemos los cuatro países más grandes de ALBA. En 2005, año siguiente a la constitución de ese grupo, Cuba nos vendió bienes por el orden de 52.9 millones de dólares, mientras que en 2013 alcanzó la suma de 352 millones. Bolivia exportó a Venezuela en aquel año, 210 millones de dólares, y en 2013, 351 millones. Ecuador nos vendió en 2005, 155.8 millones de dólares, y en 2013, 936.6 millones. Por su parte, Nicaragua no nos vendió nada en 2005, en cambio en 2013, exportó productos  a Venezuela por 250 millones de dólares.

Si examinamos las exportaciones venezolanas a esos países, nos encontramos con que en 2005, a Bolivia exportamos 5.7 millones de dólares, y en 2013, sólo 280 mil dólares.  En el caso de Cuba, en aquel año le vendimos bienes por un monto de 95.9 millones de dólares; mientras que en 2013, exportamos a ese país 6.7 millones. Por su parte, a Ecuador exportamos en 2005, 301.7 millones de dólares, y en 2013 apenas 13.5 millones. A Nicaragua vendimos en 2005, 5.7 millones, y en 2013 sólo 55.000 dólares.

Estos son datos oficiales del Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, organismo del Estado.

                            Exportaciones de 4 países de ALBA a Venezuela

                                                    (en millones de dólares)

País/año	2005	2013
Bolivia	52.9	352
Cuba	210	351
Ecuador	155.8	936.6
Nicaragua	0	250
Total	417 .7	1.889.6

                                            (Fuente: INE de Venezuela)

                                    Exportaciones de Venezuela a 4 países de ALBA

                                                      (en millones de dólares)

País/año	2005	2013
Bolivia	5.7	0.28
Cuba	95.9	6.7
Ecuador	301.7	13.5
Nicaragua	5.7	0.05
Total	408.0	20.53

                                                    (Fuente: INE de Venezuela)

En números redondos: en 2005 vendimos alrededor de 408 millones a esos países de ALBA y 9 años después, sólo 20.5 millones de dólares.

Pregunto al lector si después de ver tales cifras se puede decir que nuestro país ha obtenido algún beneficio.

Es, sin duda, el peor trato que haya hecho Venezuela en su historia y constituye una afrenta hacia los que en nuestro país están necesitados de vivienda, salud, educación, medicinas, alimentos y seguridad.

Para rematar, resulta una ironía y es hasta risible, que el gobierno destructor de Venezuela, en materia económica, haga todo lo contrario de los países que reciben sus dádivas a través de ALBA. 
La ALBA es una enorme estafa de la que los venezolanos deberían estar conscientes.

EMILIO NOUEL V.

@ENouelV

emilio.nouel@gmail.com

¿EXISTE REALMENTE UN NACIONALISMO LATINOAMERICANO? ¿ES SÓLO WISHFUL THINKING? 
              


                                  



"La resurrección de los muertos servía, pues, para glorificar las nuevas luchas"

                                                                                      CARLOS MARX

"Una nación es un grupo de personas unidas por un error común acerca
de sus antepasados y un disgusto común por sus vecinos"
                               
                                                                                      E.B. WHITE

"América Latina no existe...Somos europeos en el destierro"

                                                                                    JORGE LUIS BORGES

La idea nacionalista en América Latina está muy ligada al tema de la integración. No pocos hombres públicos impulsaron desde el siglo XIX el sueño de una suerte de nacionalismo latinoamericano, fundamentado en una supuesta identidad común entre las que fueron colonias de España y Portugal. 

En el altar sagrado de los mitos de América Latina, el nacionalismo de la llamada Patria Grande tiene lugar privilegiado.

En general, el nacionalismo, como idea o visión, ha sido una noción muy controvertida, y como objeto de estudio, para algunos historiadores, es un tema espinoso. Si mal no recuerdo, Hanna Arendt al referirse a él lo llamó nacional-tribalismo.

El profesor norteamericano Benedict Anderson ha señalado que nación, nacionalidad y nacionalismo son términos difíciles de definir y analizar. Es amplia la polémica sobre este asunto, frente al cual hay enfoques encontrados.

No pocos lo señalan como “paso retrógrado en la historia” (Lord Acton), causa de guerras (Renan) y potencialmente imperialista (Northedge).

No obstante, como conjunto de ideas ha sido un fuerte estímulo para líderes políticos y sociales, y ha incidido sensiblemente en el devenir de muchos países.  

En tanto que fuente de inspiración, ha servido para fines sociales plausibles, pero también ha conducido a situaciones políticas aberrantes.

Se ha afirmado que es un sentimiento de cohesión e identidad que se va configurando de forma progresiva en el marco de un país o de un territorio determinado. Juan Pablo Fusi agrega que es un “principio último de la legitimidad del orden político”.

El nacionalismo se entiende en dos sentidos. Habría uno, afirmativo, progresista, universalista y abierto a la cooperación entre las naciones, y otro, negativo, xenófobo, ligado a ideas racistas, étnicas, culturales y militaristas.

El nacionalismo aparece en Europa en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, al calor de los procesos de construcción de los estados modernos. El francés Maurice Barrés dirá en 1894: “el nacionalismo es la ley de los pueblos modernos”.

En América, en su conjunto, podríamos decir que sin llamarse como tal, existió tempranamente un sentimiento nacionalista difuso pero intenso que compartían los criollos de los distintos territorios coloniales que estaban bajo el dominio inglés, español y portugués. Expresiones como “americanidad”, “el nuevo mundo es nuestra patria”, “la causa de América”, “Nuestra América”, “América para los americanos”, entre otras, denotan ese indefinido sentimiento “nacional”, ampliado a todo un continente, sobre todo, en una clase política e intelectual que lideró la lucha independentista cada una con sus especificidades anglosajonas e iberoamericanas. Brasil, un caso particular que guarda relación con el desarrollo especial que tuvo con su metrópoli, Portugal, cuyos monarcas se vieron obligados a establecerse en nuestro continente, huyendo de la invasión napoleónica.     

En nuestro hemisferio, el nacionalismo ha devenido en ideología y sufrió la influencia del europeo, el cual devino con el tiempo en uno más asociado a valores tradicionales, históricos o militares.

Fusi señala que el nacionalismo, en su desarrollo histórico europeo, hizo de los elementos de diferenciación cultural –lengua, etnia y religión- la base de la identidad nacional. Para este autor, el nacionalismo asumió “formas agresivas e intolerantes, identificándose con ideas de grandeza nacional, expansionismo militar y superioridad racial, populistas y antiliberales”. Así, el nacionalismo-sentimiento inicial se volvió luego una ideología, una teoría, una doctrina en las que se fundamentaba la acción política y la acción del Estado. Más tarde, aparecerá un nacionalismo autoritario y antidemocrático, caldo de cultivo de los movimientos nazifascistas que tuvieron su eco en tierras suramericanas. El peronismo y el estado novo de Getulio Vargas son ejemplos de ello, entre otros.

Anderson señala que una nación es una “comunidad política imaginada, inherentemente limitada y soberana”, en la que sus habitantes tienen en la mente una “imagen de su comunión” y “la nación se concibe como un compañerismo profundo, horizontal”.

¿Son los países latinoamericanos un conjunto social cohesionado en torno a elementos étnicos, culturales y políticos comunes, que los diferencian sustancialmente de sus raíces múltiples europeas, indígenas y africanas? ¿Tenemos los latinoamericanos una identidad particular, individualizada, que nos distancia del resto del género humano o es solo una aspiración que pensadores y políticos han alimentado desde nuestra independencia política? ¿El mestizaje cultural de Latinoamérica nos autoriza para hablar de un conjunto humano diferente, específico, de una civilización nueva y distinta que se habría configurado durante los últimos 5 siglos? ¿Puede hablarse con propiedad de Latinoamérica como una nación en formación? ¿O es solo un sueño sin sustento real  o existe una base real para proclamar un nacionalismo latinoamericano que reúna a todos los países ubicados entre el Rio Grande y la Patagonia?  

¿Puede hablarse de “una representación de nosotros mismos” los latinoamericanos, de una cosmovisión compartida?

El tema, sin duda, es polémico. Hay respuestas divergentes a esas interrogantes. 

A mi juicio, lo que queda claro es que hay varias latinoaméricas diferenciadas, a pesar de los elementos comunes y de los intentos fallidos de unidad de ellas durante más de dos siglos.

Luego de océanos retóricos, de proyectos fracasados o inconclusos, de refundaciones o relanzamientos, hoy por hoy no estamos frente a una nación individualizada que conformarían todos los países iberoamericanos, ni de cara a hechos concretos, más allá de los tratados, de que aquella pueda crearse, sobre todo en un planeta cada vez más integrado, fluido y poroso en todos los sentidos (económico, cultural, tecnológico).

Si alguna vez fue posible una nación latinoamericana integrada, una federación política de cara al mundo, en la actualidad es ya una quimera.

EMILIO NOUEL V.

@ENouelV

emilio.nouel@gmail.com

EL SOFISMA ENTRE LEGITIMIDAD Y LEGALIDAD


Carlos Fernandez Liesa

El presidente de la Generalitat, Artur Mas, apelaba en presencia del fiscal jefe de Cataluña, José María Romero de Tejada, en la entrega de los Premios del Día de la Justicia, a “no confrontar la legitimidad democrática y la legalidad del Estado de derecho, porque eso supone llevar las cosas al límite”. La tesis que viene a mantener el señor Mas es que el presidente del Gobierno español se habría venido aferrando a la legalidad española, mientras que él sería el portador de la legitimidad democrática. Esta manera de ver las cosas constituye un sofisma, es decir, un argumento en defensa de una tesis que, sin embargo, es falsa.

Desde la perspectiva de la legalidad recordemos que según el derecho internacional el pueblo catalán no está incluido dentro de aquellos que son titulares del derecho de libre determinación. Tampoco el derecho internacional, en ningún instrumento jurídico o político, reconoce el derecho a decidir, que es un sinónimo adulterado del anterior. Allí está el precedente de las islas Åland, de los años veinte. La referencia al derecho a decidir puede ser una invocación a la democracia, que enlaza con la legitimidad democrática como mejor modelo, pero no resuelve la cuestión de cuál es el cuerpo electoral, que en nuestro sistema constitucional es la nación soberana, que es la española.

En los modelos antiguos de la Edad Media no se distinguía entre legalidad y legitimidad, pues en la teoría descendente del poder la jerarquía legal era legítima (Carl Schmitt). Esta equiparación entre legalidad y legitimidad también se ha dado en modelos modernos. Es verdad que en la modernidad se construye una nueva legitimidad, al sustituirse, como indica Habermas, el derecho sacro de origen divino por el derecho natural racional, en una nueva ética profana desligada de la religión. Pero cuando llegan con fuerza en el XIX y XX el positivismo y el normativismo, la legitimidad se vuelve a convertir en la creencia en la legalidad, que en mi opinión son nociones distintas.

Max Weber, referente de análisis de los modelos de legitimidad (religiosa, carismática, racional legal, este último es el modelo democrático), identifica legitimidad y legalidad, en una posición algo insuficiente. Por ello Habermas —o Rawls— han considerado que la dominación política no puede tener su legitimidad al margen de una teoría procedimental de la justicia. Un modelo, aunque sea democrático, necesita ser legítimo en el sentido de que se respeten no solo las reglas jurídicas sino también los procedimientos de cambio y que, además, sea permeable a valores y principios morales, o si se quiere de ética pública. Todos estos criterios, tanto los weberianos como estos últimos, se encuentran en la Constitución de 1978; nuestra Carta Magna aúna no solo la legalidad sino también la legitimidad.

En el debate legalidad-legitimidad todos tendrían que respetar el fair play, las reglas del juego limpio, la lealtad a lo pactado, además del clásico pacta sunt servanda. El núcleo duro del consenso constitucional no es solo legalidad sino también legitimidad, cuya transformación requiere respetar el procedimiento de cambio de las reglas y, por tanto, seguir la vía de los artículos 166 o 167 de la Constitución. Son las reglas constitucionales las que, al organizar el poder, permiten que Artur Mas sea molt honorable, por lo que debería ser leal con la legalidad y la legitimidad que son la fuente de su poder. Es legítimo que pretenda cambiarlas, pero no lo es que se las salte para ello. Mas ha perdido, hace tiempo, la legitimidad de ejercicio. Decía Kelsen, en su Teoría general del Derecho y el Estado, que legalidad y legitimidad son la misma cosa, salvo en caso de golpes de Estado. El señor Mas ha indicado que la no aceptación por el Tribunal Constitucional del estatuto catalán supuso la ruptura del consenso constitucional. Este argumento no se sostiene, pues es el órgano que ejerce el control de constitucionalidad.

Esto requiere altura de miras de todos y una renovación del consenso constitucional que permita su desarrollo o su reforma. No puede hacerse con titulares de periódicos sino encontrando fórmulas que permitan o una mutación constitucional, en el sentido de Jellinek, o una reforma constitucional, ambas desde el fortalecimiento del consenso. Finalmente habría que poner en valor que la Constitución de 1978 ha permitido lo mejor de nuestra historia y que el “derecho alternativo” que se nos ofrece es una quimera, como dijera su majestad el rey Juan Carlos, que se plantea al margen de la Unión Europea, del euro, de las organizaciones internacionales, de los lazos humanos que a todos nos unen y de la historia común.Junto a la legalidad y a la legitimidad no hay que olvidar el principio de efectividad que exige que el Estado de derecho no se doblegue ante los embates separatistas. Hay que defender el Estado, y el Estado de derecho, que en el caso de España no solo es lo legal sino también lo legítimo, lo que también es aplicable en Cataluña. Y también requiere esto una inteligencia emocional en el tratamiento de la cuestión, y de la riqueza de España, que tiene como una de sus señas de identidad la diversidad lingüística y cultural. Esa unidad en la diversidad, que es nuestra señala de identidad, requiere una gestión política que es muy compleja. Por ello, tanto el PP como el PSOE, o el resto de los partidos que no quieren hundir el sistema democrático actual, deben no solo defender la legalidad y la legitimidad de la Constitución, sino también intentar que siga siendo un pacto fuerte para el futuro, con la flexibilidad que se requiere para gestionar sociedades diversas.

Carlos R. Fernández Liesa es catedrático de Derecho internacional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

FMI insta a América Latina a “rejuvenecer” su integración económica

El Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) llamó este viernes a los países de América Latina a “rejuvenecer” sus múltiples mecanismos de integración económica, dado que sus beneficios agregados no están “claros”.

Al exponer en la conferencia “Desafíos para asegurar el crecimiento y una prosperidad compartida en América Latina”, la directora del FMI, Christine Lagarde, dijo que los múltiples mecanismos de integración que tiene hoy la región se asemejan a un gran plato de espaguetis.

“La integración comercial regional debe ser rejuvenecida”, afirmó Lagarde, aludiendo a mecanismos de integración como el Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA), la Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas (Unasur) y el Sistema de Integración Centroamericana (SICA), reseña AFP.

“Sus beneficios agregados no están claros”, agregó la economista francesa, agregando que en la región se debería “reevaluar el enfoque actual para el comercio y crear nuevas formas de integración”.

Lagarde también dijo que la relación del FMI y América Latina ha cambiado, pasando de ser un organismo “de respuesta (a las) crisis” a uno que entrega asistencia técnica a los países para evitar la emergencia de nuevas crisis.

“Es por ello que estamos aquí esta semana: para entablar un diálogo, aprender de ustedes, y aumentar nuestra comprensión de sus economías y de las preocupaciones y aspiraciones de su gente”, dijo Lagarde.

La conferencia que abrió Lagarde reúne por dos días en Santiago a ministros, expertos y autoridades económicas de América Latina.

-Delincuencia y falta de infraestructura-

Los altos niveles de delincuencia y la falta de infraestructura atentan también contra el desarrollo de América Latina, advirtió Lagarde.

Latinoamérica es una de las regiones más violentas del planeta. De acuerdo a datos del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (Pnud), más de un millón de personas murieron como consecuencia de la violencia criminal en la última década.

“El costo humano es enorme, pero el crimen también perjudica el desarrollo económico y corroe las instituciones democráticas”, advirtió la directora del FMI.

Por otro lado, la falta de infraestructura es también un problema urgente en la región, donde los altos costos del transporte de mercancías obstaculizan la integración.

“Muchos países necesitan mejorar significativamente sus redes de infraestructura”, dijo Lagarde, llamando a incrementar sus inversiones en este rubro, junto con una mayor colaboración para permitir más dinamismo del comercio.

América Latina enfrenta este año la perspectiva de un menor crecimiento económico, el más bajo en cinco años, con una expansión esperada de apenas un 1,1% y una tibia recuperación en 2015, como consecuencia de una caída de las inversiones y el fin del ciclo de altos precios de las materias primas.